We impute a global social welfare function that is consistent with the burden sharing in the Kyoto Protocol and in two proposals for a post-Kyoto treaty. The Kyoto Protocol favored the EU. The Frankel proposal for a post-Kyoto treaty continues the favorable treatment of the EU, while the EU proposal puts more weight on the wellbeing of other OECD countries at the expense of its own residents. Ignoring income differences, the EU proposal for a post-Kyoto treaty favors developing countries. However, if income differences are taken into account, the EU proposal is not at all generous to developing countries.
International Climate Policy and Regional Welfare Weights
Introduction
Climate policy is a moral issue. If one does not care about the remote future, about faraway lands, or small risks with large consequences, then one does not care about climate change.
Any statement about the desirability of certain cuts in greenhouse gas emissions is therewith an ethical judgment. Decisions about abatement targets reflect the costs of emission reduction and the dangers of climate change, but also the relative value placed on the costs posed on some people and dangers relieved from others. In this paper, we investigate the welfare functions that are implicit in stated emissions targets.
We approach this as follows. Assuming a global welfare function, we derive an equation for optimal greenhouse gas emission reduction per region. We populate this equation with emission scenarios, abatement cost estimates, estimates of the avoided impact of climate change, and assumptions about inequality aversion and time preference. We then assume that the stated emission reduction target is optimal, and solve the equation for the welfare weights in the welfare function. It is obvious that there are a large number of assumptions, so we conduct extensive sensitivity analyses.
Note that we assume that differences in marginal welfare in different regions are the reason for differentiation of the carbon tax. A global, uniform tax or a tradable permit scheme leading to a uniform global carbon price (Nordhaus, 2008 ) is the optimal policy instrument in a world where the economy works efficiently except for the carbon externality. It may not be the best solution when implemented in a second-best world. A factor that is important in this context is the limited feasibility of international income redistributions after a harmonized carbon price is applied (Laffont, 1988) . Chichilnisky and Heal (1994) and Anthoff (2009) point out the significance of income allocation for efficiency of policy, arguing that a global uniform carbon tax is efficient only when lump-sum transfer of income is feasible. In practice, such perfect global transfer is difficult to be achieved for at least two reasons. The first is the sheer scale of economic gaps -income levels differ up to one hundred fold across countries, and any attempt to significantly alter the distributions would involve a considerable financial flow accompanying various distortions. The other is the absence of effective global institutions to manage redistributions -the effectiveness of foreign aid even at the current level, which is far less than 1% of income for developed nations, is questioned by some of the most serious observers in the field (Easterly, 2006; Collier, 2007 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our methodological approach, which is framed in the spirit of Eyckmans et al.'s (1993) with small modifications to fit our scope. Section 3 shows our results. Section 4 concludes.
Method
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We consider a simple static model of greenhouse gas reduction in the spirit of Eyckmans et al.
(1993). Here, n regions with different income levels reduce emissions of greenhouse gases.
Emission reduction policy is chosen for each region. As greenhouse gas concentrations are uniform across all regions, the benefit of reduction for each region is a function of the global total amount of emission reduction, whereas the cost is incurred only by respective regions where emission reduction takes place. Let the costs of emission reduction be given by
where R i is the (absolute amount of) emission reduction for region . The emission reduction R i is also expressed as r i E i , where r i and E i are the proportional emission reduction and uncontrolled emissions, respectively.
The Kyoto Protocol makes it clear that the signatories are subject to "common but differentiated responsibilities" (Article 10). (1)
where α i is the unit cost parameter.
Let the benefits of emission reduction B i be a function of emission reduction R=(R 1 ,…,R n ) of all regions:
where β i is the unit benefit parameter.
We will analysis various potential global climate treaties, by assumption regions cooperate on emission reductions for those. Cooperative emission reduction follows from
for all N i ∈ Equation (4) is applicable if costs and benefits are evaluated on a monetary basis, in other words, differences in marginal utility across regions are ignored. A more general form of solutions can be obtained by taking account of a social welfare function. Let P i denote the population size of region i. We consider a utilitarian social welfare function with some regionspecific welfare weight ω i . With a uniform per-capita income y i within each region i, the social welfare function W is expressed as:
where U(y i ) is the utility function for the population of region i:
Once a climate policy is in place, the costs and benefits of reduction are added to income:
where i Y is the baseline output without climate policy for region i.
Cooperative emission reduction is deduced from the maximization of social welfare (5).
The first-order conditions are: With levels of other parameters given, we estimate the levels of revealed welfare weights that respective policies or policy proposals imply.
To this end, we calibrate the parameters α and β with the integrated assessment model FUND, 6 which is described and applied by Tol (2002a, b). As our analysis is static, we make the following additional assumptions in using data from the dynamic model FUND. Abatement costs are taken from a long-run relationship between mitigation costs and emission reduction (time-discounted average for the period 2010-2030).
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For simplicity and clarity, we only focus on carbon dioxide as greenhouse gas. We consider two cases for abatement costs: regionally-heterogeneous marginal costs and globally uniform marginal costs (i.e., a perfect international emission trading is feasible). Unlike abatement costs, benefits of reduction are brought about over a long time horizon. Thus, the marginal benefits of reduction correspond to the time-discounted sum of marginal benefits for all years (whose absolute value equals the marginal social cost of carbon). We choose a 1%/year pure time preference rate (prtp) for our base case and examine alternative cases with 0%/year and 3%/year. 
Results
Here we show our estimated regional welfare weights. We examine three policy examples.
The first is the Kyoto Protocol (Case A), the second is the EU's post-Kyoto policy proposal (Case B). Finally, we consider a recent proposal by Frankel (2009) , which specifies quantitative targets globally over a long time horizon (Case C).
9 Table 2 The EU is the self-proclaimed world leader on international climate policy. The EU proposal for a post-Kyoto agreement also has targets for developing countries (with an exception for the least developed ones). When evaluated from a monetary perspective (η=0), the proposed targets appear to be very generous: The EU places between 4.5 and 47 times more weight on the welfare of poor people than on the welfare of its own residents.
However, for η>0, this vanishes. While for η=2, the pure welfare weight ω tends to be greater than unity; for η=2, ω<1. Figure 1 shows that the weights are indeed strongly sensitive to the elasticity of marginal utility (inequity aversion) in lower income regions such as China and South Asia. Normal probability distribution of η with a mean of 1.49 and a standard deviation of 0.19. We use this to construct a probability density function of ω. Figure 2 shows the probability distributions of welfare weight for three selected regions (USA, China and South Asia). As shown in Table 3 , E(ω i ) are generally lower than 1 in low-income regions. This result hints at the EU proposal's relative toughness on developing regions. As before, the OECD regions and the former Soviet Union are treated disproportionally well by the EU proposal. Table 3 ). The estimates are below 2 for most regions, and some regions even show values below 1 (South America and South Asia). USA's light reduction burden and high income is translated into a negative inequity aversion.
While we interpret the different emission reduction targets as revealing negotiation power, it may of course also be that policy makers use different abatement costs than we do. Table 3 shows what happens if we assume that emission reduction costs are uniform across the world.
To some approximation, this may be the result of vigorous international trade in emission allowances. Under these assumptions, the pure welfare weight of the EU (West) is always greater than that of any other region. The Kyoto Protocol served the EU best, as does the Frankel proposal and indeed the EU proposal for a post-Kyoto agreement. This research should be extended in the following ways. Replication with alternative assumptions about the costs and benefits of greenhouse gas emission reduction would be welcome. Alternative social welfare functions should be investigated. Our static framework should be replaced with a dynamic one. Other proposals for targets and burden-sharing should be evaluated. All this is deferred to future research. T. Callan, C. Keane and J.R. Walsh
